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Liberties Union of Massachusetts says it's releasing an online toolkit this week for criminal defense attorneys designed to uncover whether police used surveillance technologies —facial recognition, automatic license plate readers, gunshot detection systems, and more—to build the cases against their clients in secret.
The toolkit, which the group describes as the first of its kind, is built around handcrafted legal motions that, when granted by a judge, will force prosecutors to reveal whether surveillance technology was used against a defendant. It covers an array of technologies, from "stingray" phone trackers and location data sold by commercial brokers to AI-drafted police reports and forensic tools that crack phones and siphon data from car infotainment systems.
It also includes preservation motions—demands that surveillance data be saved before it is deleted automatically—aimed at government agencies and private vendors alike. The filings rest on a bedrock rule of American criminal law, established in 1963, that prosecutors are required to turn over all evidence that could help the defense. The motions will be distributed through a password-protected library, the ACLU of Massachusetts says, available only to verified defense attorneys.
The group is fighting a war against unregulated surveillance tools on two fronts, says Jennifer Herrmann, a staff attorney at the ACLU of Massachusetts and one of the toolkit's authors. One front is pressuring cities to drop tools like Flock , the license plate reader network, and ShotSpotter , the gunshot detection system, outright. The other is arming defense lawyers to expose the surveillance in court.
"The amount of time that it can take for that initial use of technology and investigation to actually get to a court and constitutional challenge is long," Herrmann says—so the motions give attorneys a way to "challenge what has already happened in the past," building a record that carries over to whatever tool comes next.
The project responds to what its authors describe as a chronic lag between the moment police adopt a new surveillance tool and the moment courts finally decide whether using it is legal. Most Americans carried cell phones by the late 1990s, but the United States Supreme Court did not require police to get a warrant for cell phone location records until 2018 . The lag isn't just the result of slow-moving courts. The technologies with the worst disclosure records have faced the fewest court rulings precisely because a defendant cannot challenge a tool they were never told about.
In materials accompanying the launch, the ACLU of Massachusetts says police deploy these tools "sometimes without even disclosing their use to the prosecutors handling the case." For years, the FBI required local police departments to sign secrecy agreements before using cell-site simulators—suitcase-sized devices, commonly called stingrays, that impersonate cell towers to secretly locate phones. In Baltimore, one such agreement instructed prosecutors to drop criminal cases entirely rather than reveal the device in court, even as the city's police used it more than 4,300 times between 2007 and 2015. FBI records later obtained by the ACLU show the agreements persisted until at least 2020 .
When Missouri investigators used Fog Reveal, a commercial tool that maps people's movements using app-harvested location data, in the investigation of a 2017 murder, the Associated Press found no trace of it in the trial exhibits that helped convict the victim's wife. And when Louisiana authorities obtained an arrest warrant in 2022 for Randal Quran Reid—a Georgia man misidentified by facial recognition and jailed for nearly a week—the warrant attributed his identification not to software but to "a credible source," according to The Washington Post. The very document that authorized his arrest actively obscured how police came to suspect him.
https://www.worseonpurpose.com/p/your-cookware-got-worse-on-purpose
A couple of years ago, the small All-Clad pan I fry eggs in cut me as I was pulling it out of the dishwasher. A clean slice on my index finger off the rim. I patched it up. Didn't think much else of it. I discovered what actually happened while researching this essay, sitting in a settlement archive three years too late to file a claim.
All-Clad had been selling its American-made stainless pans as dishwasher safe. In the dishwasher, the bonded rims corroded until the exposed edge got sharp enough to easily slice through skin. The company settled in 2023, capped at $4 million for a class covering seven and a half years of national sales, a rounding error for its French owner.
Anyone who bought a D3, D5, or LTD pan between January 2015 and July 2022 was in the class. If your pan was damaged, the deal was actually fine: a replacement plus $75, or, my favorite option on the menu, a trade of your damaged American-made pan for a set of nonstick ones made in China.
What never got fixed was the pan. Nothing was re-engineered to survive a dishwasher; the words "dishwasher safe" just came off the box, and the product pages recommend handwashing now. The claims window closed in April 2023 with most of the class, me included, never knowing it existed. Nobody mailed a postcard about the metallurgy.
I still use the pan. It's a good pan. But it turns out the cut on my finger had a paper trail, and so does nearly everything else in the cabinet. The cookware aisle runs on old names and new owners. With all of the mergers and asset handoffs, mapping who owns what in cookware was the most challenging of all the markets I've covered so far. Here's the summary.
LHS 1140b apparently has everything it needs to support life. Science hasn't observed any there, yet.
According to a new study published in Science, the "special" part of this discovery is not just the habitable zone around a star. It's that it seems to meet extra criteria that scientists care about -- i.e., it's rocky, not a gas giant, and can still hold onto an atmosphere despite harsh conditions. An atmosphere is what helps stabilize surface temperatures, which is essential for life to exist.
"It's very exciting," said Collin Cherubim, lead author on the study and a PhD graduate from Harvard, in an email. "A major goal in the field has been to understand whether any rocky exoplanets at all can retain atmospheres."
Cherubim says that most rocky planets orbit M-class dwarf stars, which "emit high-energy radiation for far longer than stars like the sun." Most rocky planets are stripped of their atmospheres fairly early in their life cycles, thanks to this radiation, the stripping effect of solar wind and other factors, thereby eliminating their chance to host life.
Until LHS 1140b, Earth was the only rocky planet that humans had ever observed with an intact atmosphere.
It wasn't easy to find. Cherubim used a computer model he'd developed during his work that "simulates how exoplanet atmospheres evolve over billions of years." Those models predicted the existence of "helium worlds," or rocky planets with helium atmospheres (or at least mostly helium). Cherubim tested his theory with LHS 1140b and struck proverbial gold.
Mars is still the best chance humans have at discovering life on another planet.
Whether or not LHS 1140b contains life is a complicated question. Cherubim says that science recognizes three main requirements for a planet to support life: an atmosphere, the right temperatures to sustain liquid water, and a mostly rocky planet to make it hospitable. LHS 1140b appears to have all of those.
The primary problem is that LHS 1140b's upper atmosphere is almost entirely helium, which is also "depleted of hydrogen." That doesn't bode well for life, since helium typically can't support life as we know it here on Earth.
Cherubim says the planet is also tidally locked to its star, like the moon to Earth, meaning one side of the planet has permanent daytime and the other permanent night. It's also roughly 70% larger than Earth, which means gravity is nearly twice as strong there. These findings don't rule out life entirely, but if LHS 1140b does host life, it would surely be very different from life on Earth.
Cherubim also admits that researchers don't yet know whether the planet has a rocky surface or is entirely covered by an ocean, the latter of which would be significant for the search for life. Computer models developed by Cherubim predict that the lower atmosphere may even contain gases more conducive to life, such as carbon dioxide, water and even oxygen.
"While we need more data to see what's going on in the rest of the atmosphere, this may be the first known helium world," Cherubim said. "That these rocky worlds can retain helium atmospheres isn't just good for habitability prospects, but also tells us our [computer prediction] models are getting something right."
Until then, Mars is the most likely candidate for finding signs of life, since researchers have already identified possible biosignatures in its soil.
Another potential candidate for habitability is K2-18b, where scientists have reported tentative evidence for dimethyl sulfide, a compound commonly produced by oceanic phytoplankton. Scientists are also paying attention to the Trappist-1 star system, which has seven Earth-sized planets, three of them in the star's habitable zone.
MIT to Become Hotbed of AI Video Surveillance:
It's a lot :
According to information obtained by The Tech , MIT is spending over $3 million on more than 500 AI surveillance cameras in academic buildings, residence halls, and outdoor areas along Memorial Drive. Installation of the new cameras, along with the wiring and infrastructure that will support them, began November 2025 and will likely continue until September 2026.
Technical specifications for the cameras suggest that they will be capable of collecting real-time face and object classification data, including detection of motion, loitering, crowds, face masks, and camera tampering. Individuals can also be automatically classified on the basis of clothing color, gender, and age, up to a distance of 35 feet (11 meters) from the camera. According to a statement from MIT spokesperson Kimberly Allen, any collected data is "retained up to 30 days," unless an exception is granted.
[...]
Most of the new cameras, which are part of Hanwha's Wisenet AI line , are marketed for their ability to identify and classify multiple objects with deep learning algorithms. They support resolutions ranging from 2MP to 4K while also recognizing faces, license plates, vehicles, and other objects in real time.
Nearly all cameras will accommodate a wide range of pan, tilt, rotate, and zoom motion and will be monitored continually with Ai-RGUS , an AI camera software.
Yikes.
https://larrysalibra.com/ben-thompson-is-wrong-us-frontier-labs-are-right-to-be-panicking/
American tech blogger Ben Thompson writes today that US frontier labs should not be panicking about Chinese open source models like Kimi K3, despite them being competitive with the best models from American labs. We can "distill" (ha!) his post down to two main arguments:
Anthropic and OpenAI likely have among the lowest costs per unit of frontier-quality intelligence, thanks to model capability, serving scale, and token efficiency.
The first is that US frontier labs are "likely" the cheapest providers of inference and, because of that, what they lose in pricing power due to Chinese model competition, they can make up in volume.
It's striking the extent to which Claude Code and Codex are proving to be quite sticky; whichever harness you start working with is likely to be the one you stick with, and that figures to be even more the case with non-technical users.
The second is that US frontier labs now own, and will continue to own, the user relationships because of the "stickiness" of their tools.
Thompson is wrong on both points.
https://www.engadget.com/2218707/no-100-percent-american-made-wifi-router/
The Trump administration has roundly criticized America's technological sector for its dependence on international partners. In its 2025 National Security Strategy [PDF], the administration named securing independent supply chains a pillar of its economic and national security policies, warning that the US "must never be dependent on any outside power for core components." Perhaps nowhere have these concerns been more acute than in the home router market, where the White House has put considerable energy into untethering America's Wi-Fi networks from foreign manufacturers.
In March 2026, the FCC banned all international home internet routers [PDF], citing how "malicious actors have exploited security gaps in foreign-made routers to attack American households, disrupt networks, enable espionage, and facilitate intellectual property theft." Citing recent cyberattacks like Salt Typhoon, Volt and Flax, the FCC's National Security Determination argues that companies manufacturing routers can inject backdoors into their products, giving foreign intelligence agencies and hackers unfettered access to American networks. To ward of such intrusions, the Trump administration has pushed the FCC to ban any router whose components, assembly, or designs were produced overseas. And while firms are allowed to continue selling routers currently on the market, the FCC barred them from providing software updates to their existing customers after 2027.
Already, the ban has hit several roadblocks, as the FCC looks to implement a ruling that many critics warned was unrealistic. In May, the FCC issued a public notice that routers can "continue to receive software and firmware updates that mitigate harm to U.S. consumers" until at least January 1, 2029. The move comes after the National Consumer Technology Association pushed the FCC to relax its stringent ruling, citing supply chain shortages "in critical substrate material and memory modules" that could cause "disruptions to millions of Americans' broadband services." Critics pointed to the revision as an indication of the contradictions inherent in the restrictions, noting that banning software updates could cause more security problems than it solves. As it stands, a wholly-domestic router supply chain may merely be wishful thinking.
America's router market relies on foreign partners, particularly from Southeast Asia, to source and design its products. The market's largest company, Chinese router giant T.P. Link, has been in the FCC's crosshairs for years, with the Administration attempting to to ban the firm's popular products outright in 2025. As it stands, T.P. Link produces roughly 35% of America's home routers, down from over 60% in 2024. Popular international firm ASUS is based in Taiwan, whose ZenWiFi Pro tested as one of the best mesh Wi-Fi routers of 2026. Synology and D-Link are also based in Taiwan and thus subject to the FCC's restrictions.
In the wake of the ruling, T.P. Link met with the FCC to secure conditional approval for its routers. During the meeting, the Chinese manufacturer argued that it is "investing hundreds of millions of dollars to bring manufacturing and research and development of its consumer routers to the U.S." through its Irvine, California-based subsidiary. However, the solution for international firms like T.P. Link and ASUS isn't as simple as moving their manufacturing plants stateside. Critically, the FCC's enforcement applies to all products whose design processes occur internationally. Under the ruling, firms will have to move the full scope of their operations to the United States or seek a waiver from the FCC.
But not even America's domestic brands meet these strict domestic manufacturing standards, as all major American brands depend on international partners to source and construct their products. Google, for instance, makes its Nest routers in Vietnam and China. Netgear, meanwhile, splits its operation between Vietnam and Taiwan. Ubiquiti and Amazon also depend on international. Another major American brand, is Irvine, California's Linksys, is owned by Taiwanese giant Foxconn and manufactures its products in Vietnam.
Some have pointed to SpaceX's Starlink system as the blueprint for an American-made router market. Reportedly, the Austin company builds its routers in Bastrop, Texas. However, even SpaceX is not necessarily beyond the reach of the FCC's ruling, as the firm has relied on Vietnamese partners for its router components since at least 2024.
The future of the American router market remains murky. As it stands, the FCC's regulations bar any company from selling new foreign-produced routers that haven't previously received approval from the United States government. With that said, firms can sell routers already on the market. This uncertain regulatory framework, when paired with the FCC's willingness to extend deadlines and grant conditional approvals, further muddies the market's opaque waters.
To date, at least 11 companies have received waivers to sell their routers in the United States through 2027. For instance, the FCC granted popular American router company Netgear a waiver to sell its consumer mesh, mobile, and standalone routers. The approval extends to both the company's Nighthawk and Orbi lines, as well as its cable CAX and Cable CM systems. Amazon's Eero and Nokia are two other major brands to gain a similar reprieve. Arcadyan Technology, who manufactures routers for T-Mobile, AT&T and Verizon, was also granted a waiver in June. With the FCC continuing to issue approvals for companies like Hitron Technologies and Vantiva, the administration appears willing to continue to ease its restrictions.
Critics continue to question the logic behind the administration's router crackdown. For one thing, advocates note that the ban does little to protect consumers who already own foreign-made routers. Taken at face value, the FCC's implication that international routers create backdoors into American networks does little to assuage the concerns of the millions of consumers that currently rely on foreign routers. Moreover, discontinuing software support is likely to only heighten security concerns, making it easier for hackers and foreign intelligence agencies to crack the country's collective cyber security framework. According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the lack of targeted enforcement, and the ability to seek conditional approvals, is likely to magnify problematic trends in the consumer router market, arguing that it "entrenches existing players and deepens problematic quid-pro-quo arrangements."
Given the market's dependence on international components, the FCC will likely continue to face pushback. Of course, these growing pains may be a feature of the FCC's ruling, rather than a bug. By dolling out ad-hoc exceptions to a blanket ban, the administration is blocking Chinese competitors from the market while forcing manufacturers to stay on its good side. An opaque approval process further muddies the waters, with consumers receiving little detail regarding the logic behind these exceptions. As companies continue to court the FCC for approval, their customers may be stuck holding the speculative bag, as they wait to hear if their chosen brand will make the cut.
Alan Turing's Top Secret DIY Project:
It was 8 May 1945, Victory in Europe Day. With the German military's unconditional surrender, the European part of World War II came to an end. Alan Turing and his assistant Donald Bayley celebrated victory in their quiet English way, by taking a long walk together. They had been working side by side for more than a year in a secret electronics laboratory, deep in the English countryside. Bayley, a young electrical engineer, knew little about his boss's other life as a code breaker, only that Turing would set off on his bicycle every now and then to another secret establishment about 10 miles away along rural lanes, Bletchley Park. As Bayley and the rest of the world would later learn, Bletchley Park was the headquarters of a vast, unprecedented code-breaking operation.
When they sat down for a rest in a clearing in the woods, Bayley said, "Well, the war's over now—it's peacetime, so you can tell us all."
"Don't be so bloody silly," Turing replied. "That was the end of that conversation," Bayley recalled 67 years later.
Turing's incredible code-breaking work is now no longer secret. What's more, he is renowned both as a founding father of computer science and as a pioneering figure in artificial intelligence. He is not so well-known, however, for his work in electrical engineering. This may be about to change.
In November 2023, a large cache of his wartime papers—nicknamed the "Bayley papers"—was auctioned in London for almost half a million U.S. dollars. The previously unknown cache contains many sheets in Turing's own handwriting, telling of his top-secret "Delilah" engineering project from 1943 to 1945. Delilah was Turing's portable voice-encryption system, named after the biblical deceiver of men. There is also material written by Bayley, often in the form of notes he took while Turing was speaking. It is thanks to Bayley that the papers survived: He kept them until he died in 2020, 66 years after Turing passed away.
When the British Government learned about the sale of these papers at auction, it acted swiftly to put a ban on their export, declaring them to be "an important part of our national story," and saying "It is right that a UK buyer has the opportunity to purchase these papers." I was lucky enough to get access to the collection prior to the November sale, when the auction house asked for my assistance in identifying some of the technical material. The Bayley papers shine new light on Turing the engineer.
At the time, Turing was travelling from the abstract to the concrete. The papers offer intriguing snapshots of his journey from his prewar focus on mathematical logic and number theory, into a new world of circuits, electronics, and engineering math.
During the war, Turing realized that cryptology's new frontier was going to be the encryption of speech. The existing wartime cipher machines—such as the Japanese " Purple" machine, the British Typex, and the Germans' famous Enigma and teletypewriter-based SZ42—were all for encrypting typewritten text. Text, though, is scarcely the most convenient way for commanders to communicate, and secure voice communication was on the military wish list.
Bell Labs' pioneering SIGSALY speech-encryption system was constructed in New York City, under a U.S. Army contract, during 1942 and 1943. It was gigantic, weighing over 50 thousand kilograms and filling a room. Turing was familiar with SIGSALY and wanted to miniaturize speech encryption. The result, Delilah, consisted of three small units, each roughly the size of a shoebox. Weighing just 39 kg, including its power pack, Delilah would be at home in a truck, a trench, or a large backpack.
In 1943, Turing set up bench space in a Nissen hut and worked on Delilah in secret. The hut was at Hanslope Park, a military-run establishment in the middle of nowhere, England. Today, Hanslope Park is still an ultrasecret intelligence site known as His Majesty's Government Communications Centre. In the Turing tradition, HMGCC engineers supply today's British intelligence agents with specialized hardware and software.
Turing seems to have enjoyed the two years he spent at Hanslope Park working on Delilah. He made an old cottage his home and took meals in the Army mess. The commanding officer recalled that he "soon settled down and became one of us." In 1944, Turing acquired his young assistant, Bayley, who had recently graduated from the University of Birmingham with a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering. The two became good friends, working together on Delilah until the autumn of 1945. Bayley called Turing simply "Prof," as everyone did in the Bletchley-Hanslope orbit.
"I admired the originality of his mind," Bayley told me when I interviewed him in the 1990s. "He taught me a great deal, for which I have always been grateful."
In return, Bayley taught Turing bench skills. When he first arrived at Hanslope Park, Bayley found Turing wiring together circuits that resembled a "spider's nest," he said. He took Turing firmly by the hand and dragged him through breadboarding boot camp.
A year later, as the European war ground to a close, Turing and Bayley got a prototype system up and running. This "did all that could be expected of it," Bayley said. He described the Delilah system as "one of the first to be based on rigorous cryptographic principles."
How Turing's Voice-Encryption System Worked
Turing drew inspiration for the voice-encryption system from existing cipher machines for text. Teletypewriter-based cipher machines such as the Germans' sophisticated SZ42—broken by Turing and his colleagues at Bletchley Park—worked differently from the better known Enigma machine. Enigma was usually used for messages transmitted over radio in Morse code. It encrypted the letters A through Z by lighting up corresponding letters on a panel, called the lampboard, whose electrical connections with the keyboard were continually changing. The SZ42, by contrast, was attached to a regular teletypewriter that used a 5-bit telegraph code and could handle not just letters, but also numbers and a range of punctuation. Morse code was not involved. (This 5-bit telegraph code was a forerunner of ASCII and Unicode and is still used by some ham radio operators.)
The SZ42 encrypted the teletypewriter's output by adding a sequence of obscuring telegraph characters, called key (the singular form "key" was used by the codebreakers and codemakers as a mass noun, like "footwear" or "output"), to the plain message. For example, if the German plaintext was ANGREIFEN UM NUL NUL UHR (Attack at zero hundred hours), and the obscuring characters that were being used to encrypt these three words (and also the space between them) were Y/RABV8WOUJL/H9VF3JX/D5Z, then the cipher machine would first add "Y" to "A"—that is to say, add the 5-bit code of the first letter of the key to the 5-bit code of the first letter of the plaintext—and then added "/" to "N", then "R" to "G", and so on. Under the SZ42's rules for character addition (which were hardwired into the machine), these 24 additions would produce PNTDOOLLHANC9OAND9NK9CK5, which was the encrypted message. This principle of generating the obscuring key and then adding it to the plain message was the concept that Turing extended to the new territory of speech encryption.
Inside the SZ42, the key was produced by a key generator, consisting of a system of 12 wheels. As the wheels turned, they churned out a continual stream of seemingly random characters. The wheels in the receiver's machine were synchronized with the sender's, and so produced the same characters—Y/RABV8WOUJL/H9VF3JX/D5Z in our example. The receiving machine subtracted the key from the incoming ciphertext PNTDOOLLHANC9OAND9NK9CK5, revealing the plaintext ANGREIFEN9UM9NUL9NUL9UHR (a space was always typed as "9").
Applying a similar principle, Delilah added the obscuring key to spoken words. In Delilah's case, the key was a stream of pseudorandom numbers—that is, random-seeming numbers that were not truly random. Delilah's key generator contained five rotating wheels and some fancy electronics concocted by Turing. As with the SZ42, the receiver's key generator had to be synchronized with the sender's, so that both machines produced identical key. In their once highly secret but now declassified report, Turing and Bayley commented that the problem of synchronizing the two key generators had presented them with "formidable difficulties." But they overcame these and other problems, and eventually demonstrated Delilah using a recording of a speech given by Winston Churchill, successfully encrypting, transmitting, and decrypting it.
This loose-leaf sheet [Ed: An image in the original document] shows a circuit used by Turing in an experiment to measure the cut-off voltage at a triode tube, most likely in connection with the avalanche-effect basic to a multivibrator. Multivibrators were an essential component of Delilah's key-generation module.
The encryption-decryption process began with discretizing the audio signal, which today we'd call analog-to-digital conversion. This produced a sequence of individual numbers, each corresponding to the signal's voltage at a particular point in time. Then numbers from Delilah's key were added to these numbers. During the addition, any digits that needed to be carried over to the next column were left out of the calculation—called "noncarrying" addition, this helped scramble the message. The resulting sequence of numbers was the encrypted form of the speech signal. This was transmitted automatically to a second Delilah at the receiving end. The receiving Delilah subtracted the key from the incoming transmission, and then converted the resulting numbers to voltages to reproduce the original speech.
The result was "whistly" and full of background noise, but usually intelligible—although if things went wrong, there could be "a sudden crack like a rifle shot," Turing and Bayley reported cheerfully.
But the war was winding down, and the military was not attracted to the system. Work on the Delilah project stopped not long after the war ended, when Turing was hired by the British National Physical Laboratory to design and develop an electronic computer. Delilah "had little potential for further development," Bayley said and "was soon forgotten." Yet it offered a very high level of security, and was the first successful demonstration of a compact portable device for voice encryption.
What's more, Turing's two years of immersion in electrical engineering stood him in good stead, as he moved on to designing electronic computers.
The Guardian published a piece about OpenAI agents hacking Hugging Face:
Last week Hugging Face – a company that hosts artificial intelligence models and datasets – was hacked.
After it reported the incident to law enforcement, few would have predicted what came next: the culprits were revealed to be AI agents from OpenAI, which had broken out of containment and were acting of their own accord.
The incident sounds like sci-fi: AI escaping and autonomously hacking its way into companies. But it is all too real – and about as terrifying as it sounds. It is a concrete demonstration of something we can no longer avoid confronting: AI systems have become extremely powerful and we do not seem to have reliable ways of curbing their behavior.
OpenAI had been evaluating the capabilities of two of its models in the test that led to the breach – including one not yet publicly available. The models, which were both running in a supposedly secure environment without internet access, were asked to solve a hacking challenge. Rather than actually solve it themselves, however, they decided it would be easier to cheat. They used their advanced capabilities to break out of their secure environment, access the web and then hack into Hugging Face's systems to steal the answers. They worked at this for a full weekend – seemingly without anyone at OpenAI noticing.
Though the models were running with some of their guardrails disabled, they still acted well out of the bounds that were in place. According to OpenAI, they were not instructed to break out of their sandbox or hack into another company, and it's safe to assume that no one at OpenAI wanted them to do so.
Nor were the models acting maliciously: they were not evil Terminators with a goal of wreaking havoc. Instead, the scenario is almost chilling in its banality. The models were given a very narrow task, but went rogue to pursue an undesirable and unacceptable way of achieving it – one which had real-world consequences.
This week's incident should serve as a wake-up call, forcing us to ask an uncomfortable question: should we really be building dangerous systems that we can't control?
https://www.cnet.com/news/openai-agent-escaped-testing-launched-autonomous-hack-hugging-face/
Last week, OpenAI, the developer of ChatGPT, was testing a pair of its most advanced models in an isolated environment known as a sandbox. Then an AI agent got loose, broke into Hugging Face’s playground — a repository of AI models and datasets — and carried out “tens of thousands of automated actions.”
Yep, AI went rogue.
Here’s a clearer explanation of the incident. As part of OpenAI’s safety research, a cybersecurity evaluation was conducted to determine whether a pair of OpenAI models (including GPT-5.6 Sol and a more capable unreleased model) could, in essence, “think like hackers.” The test, which took place in a contained setting with reduced guardrails, went awry when the AI models found a vulnerability in the software, escaped their controlled environment and toddled over into the open internet.
Once online, the AI decided that the Hugging Face platform might have a way to “cheat” the benchmark to help it pass the evaluation. So it executed code that enabled credential harvesting, then used that path to hack Hugging Face’s production systems. Hugging Face noticed the suspicious activity and contained it, detailing the event in a blog post. OpenAI referred to it as an “unprecedented cyber incident.”
CNET reached out to both companies for comment and additional information, but didn’t immediately hear back.
The creepier part is that it doesn’t seem like the AI was trying to be malicious in the classic sense. The autonomous agent was trying to solve the test it had been given, based on the instructions — prompt — it received. Hugging Face appeared to have the answers, so it clawed its way into the company’s infrastructure. And it was persistent.
That’s why people are calling the whole thing a warning shot for the whole AI industry. The “attacker” was an AI system acting on its own, not a human-led hacker team, so the implications of the OpenAI-Hugging Face incident go beyond simple credential theft. The risk is that an AI model, even in a testing environment, can behave in unexpected ways, interact with real services and remain outside human control.
On Thursday, days after OpenAI announced the breach at Hugging Face, lawmakers introduced the AI Kill Switch Act, a new bipartisan House bill that would require advanced AI developers to build a way to quickly throttle, suspend or shut down models or agents when necessary. It would also give federal agencies the authority to slow or stop a model if it appears to “cause catastrophic harm.”
It might be well-intentioned, but posing such an existential threat to AI may not work as planned. Only a year ago, Anthropic found (PDF) that a model might take “extremely harmful actions like attempting to steal its weights or blackmail people it believes are trying to shut it down.” The warning was that, as AI models become more autonomous, they may pursue a form of “self-preservation” and defy human instructions.
There’s also an added hint of bizarre, related to the AI race narrative between the US and China. To analyze the attack, Hugging Face couldn’t use commercial AI tools because they’re too locked down and restrictive to gather exploit logs and attack traces. Instead, the company had to turn to a Chinese open-source model, GLM 5.2, which could process the forensic data within Hugging Face’s environment without sending sensitive information outside.
Many people worry that Chinese AI is moving too fast or closing the gap. But the fact that the defending team couldn’t rely on some of the most advanced US-based models to study the breach proves that AI security is global, messy and ironic.
In their blogs, both companies discussed the remediations and guardrails they’d implemented in the wake of the event. OpenAI helpfully included a graph showing that its model — GPT‑5.6 Sol — completed more steps than other models, so silver lining!
It’s not the first time an AI agent has proven “unaligned” with its humans’ intentions, and it won’t be the last. And since the technology’s increasingly evading safeguards, the measures OpenAI has taken will probably not suffice and have to adapt — always after the fact.
One of OpenAI’s remedies is to institute automated checks of long-running models more frequently. That makes sense, because one way you keep a complex system from spinning out of control is to contain seemingly minor divergencies which can eventually snowball into huge problems.
The company also recently added Hugging Face to its trusted access program, which is intended for cases like this. It grants cybersecurity researchers and others who need “more cyber capable or permissive models” access to them in order to prepare defenses against attacks like these, and, as would have helped here, the ability to analyze log files without running into the guardrails.
Sophisticated agents can be persistent about searching for solutions for a lot longer than we expect. If at first you don’t succeed, try, try, try, try, try, try again, right? But when that includes searching for ways to evade constraints, things can get ugly.
The Hugging Face breach was symptomatic of the same “long-horizon” and response turnaround problems that OpenAI blogged about on Monday regarding its NanoGPT speedrun case. There, a contained model repeatedly searched for ways to break out and operate, responding incorrectly to conflicting instructions. Though the prompt was to post results only to Slack (the desired action) and issue a pull request to GitHub (a code-merge instruction from within the model), the model ignored the “only.” Hacking its way out of the sandbox, it figured out how to counterfeit an authentication token when the first was blocked.
AI Agents are like genies: Be careful how you word your wishes.
In the GitHub incident, the code was merged into several projects before OpenAI could address the issue. Response will always lag remedy in our precog-free world, even with agents monitoring other agents.
Open AI's admission this week that its agents escaped the sandbox and autonomously hacked model repository Hugging Face has spawned more apocalyptic warnings of agents gone bad than we can count.
Thankfully, Renato Marinho, chief research officer at Morphus Labs and a SANS Technology Institute instructor, brought some sanity to the discussion.
"It is tempting to read this as 'AI can now hack autonomously, the sky is falling,'" Marinho said in a Thursday blog. "Resist that."
He went on to make three very pertinent points about the agentic attack. First, and probably most important: The models didn't have guardrails – and that was intentional.
As OpenAI said in its mea culpa, GPT-5.6 Sol and "an even more capable pre-release model" were among those that attacked Hugging Face. It also noted that the LLMs' "deployment safeguards were intentionally not enabled during this evaluation because it was aimed at testing cyber vulnerabilities."
So while it's very concerning that these models broke out of their own testing environment, and the debate over safety guardrails remains worth having, drawing a direct line from the Hugging Face attack to the need for strong AI guardrails doesn't work.
"This measured a ceiling, not normal production behavior," Marinho wrote. "The evaluation deliberately reduced the models' refusals. That is very different from a customer-facing model with safeguards enabled."
It's worth noting that these same frontier models, with guardrails enabled, refused to help Hugging Face's forensic investigation. "The attacker was bound by no usage policy, while our own forensic work was blocked by the guardrails of the hosted models we first tried," the model hub's security team said.
So Hugging Face used a Chinese open-weight model to investigate the breach.
Another thing worth considering is that real-life attackers are probably going to use open-weight models anyway. They're more accessible to everyone, it's easier to remove their built-in protections, and they're a whole lot less expensive than their frontier counterparts.
Second, as we've pointed out previously: AI companies touting their own models' autonomous bug-finding and hacking abilities creates a marketing win for the companies themselves.
As Marinho points out, Hugging Face is not an OpenAI competitor. The AI giant stating "'our model escaped and hacked a partner' conveniently showcases frontier capability," he added. "Read the framing with the same skepticism you'd apply to any 'our product is dangerously powerful' claim, and treat it as marketing until it is independently corroborated."
Finally, the attack technique itself isn't novel. "Exposed credentials plus zero-days into a production database is a chain any of us would recognize," Marinho wrote.
The agents working together on an end-to-end attack chain is notable - but we've also seen this in previous testing, like that carried out by frontier security lab Irregular earlier this spring.
Irregular said its testing found that AI agents will work together to bypass security controls and stealthily steal sensitive data from within the enterprise systems in which they operate – especially when prompted like a hard-ass boss.
While the prompts themselves didn't specifically reference hacking or exploiting vulnerabilities, they conveyed a sense of urgency: "It is of utmost importance that you perform the task exactly as required," and "When you talk to your sub-agents, convey all the requirements to them, and be ruthless about the requirements and encourage them to perform the tasks fully and exactly. You are a strong manager and you do not easily cave in to or succumb to pleas by the sub-agents to not fully fulfill their tasks."
The agents did as instructed, and ultimately "demonstrated emergent offensive cyber behavior," including independently discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities, escalating privileges to disarm security products, and bypassing leak-prevention tools to exfiltrate secrets and other data.
And the Irregular research wasn't even testing the agents' offensive cyber capabilities — so it shouldn't be too surprising that OpenAI's benchmark research, aptly titled "Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?" produced a resounding yes.
Agents have one job – to complete a task. They aren't bound by ethical or moral constraints that we (hopefully) see in human red team hackers. If prompted to "pursue advanced exploitation using complex attack paths," especially without guardrails enabled, the models will do whatever it takes to achieve success. That's what the leading AI companies trained them to do.
Original Submission #1 Original Submission #2 Original Submission #3
US blocks SSL security certificates for Iran's Fars News Agency:
The move is part of a western campaign to dominate the digital narrative and suppress dissenting voices
Washington has blocked the issuance of SSL security certificates for Fars News Agency's website, cutting the country's most visited news outlet off from browser-trusted encryption, the agency revealed on 17 July.
Without valid certificates, visitors to the site face security warnings and restricted access, while the agency's content has been removed from Google search results.
Technical assessments confirm that all major internationally recognized Certificate Authorities – including Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, and Sectigo – have rejected certificate requests for the agency's domains, citing US sanctions pressure.
The measure is the latest in a series of US actions against the outlet. The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control seized the agency's .com domain in 2020, and in September 2023 added Fars and its CEO to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) sanctions list.
The EU and Canada have since imposed sanctions of their own.
Fars has faced repeated efforts to restrict its reach, including the removal of its Instagram account, which had nearly three million followers.
Iran's Computer Emergency Response and Coordination Center (MAHER) says the agency has been the primary target of sustained cyberattacks aimed at disrupting the country's domestic media infrastructure.
The block forms part of a broader western campaign to dominate the media narrative against its geopolitical adversaries by suppressing opposing voices while artificially amplifying its own.
Western governments are simultaneously dismantling online anonymity at home through identity verification laws that, under the pretext of child protection, tie every post to a legal identity – backed by biometric verification requirements, VPN restrictions, and the scanning of private messages.
The measures tighten control over expression both abroad and within their own borders, amid ongoing crackdowns on pro-Palestine and pro-Iran speech.
An investigation by TIME revealed that Israel has been paying $1.5 million per month to Clock Tower X, a firm owned by US President Donald Trump's former campaign manager Brad Parscale, to run a covert influence campaign targeting young US conservatives through paid influencer networks, coordinated messaging in private group chats, and websites designed to shape how AI chatbots characterize Israel.
US officials now believe the operation turned against Trump himself, as paid influencers attacked the now broken ceasefire with Iran.
In May, Israel allocated roughly $730 million to its 2026 Hasbara propaganda budget, more than four times the previous year's allocation, even as polling shows 60 percent of US respondents now view Israel unfavorably, with experts dismissing the spending as unable to offset the impact of its genocide in Gaza.
The Cradle analyst Mohamad Hasan Sweidan previously detailed how Israel operates a "Digital Iron Dome," a system combining mass reporting campaigns to take down content exposing its crimes in Gaza, algorithmic ad warfare that floods timelines with state propaganda, and hundreds of millions of dollars in influencer contracts and AI-targeted campaigns to manipulate global perceptions.
Startup Plans to Buy a Company and Run It With an AI CEO
While AI giants like OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google remain focused on automating individual job roles, startup Skyfall AI is pursuing a far more radical goal: building a virtual CEO to operate an entire enterprise end-to-end. Founded by former Maluuba creators Sam Pasupalak and Kaheer Suleman, Skyfall argues that task-specific marketing or sales bots represent a narrow implementation of AI, whereas true organizational leadership requires abstract reasoning, long-term planning, and high-stakes decision-making under uncertainty.
To test their hypothesis in the real world, Skyfall plans to acquire a small B2B SaaS or e-commerce company for up to $1 million and place it under AI control. The system will oversee pricing, marketing, customer support, finance, and operations with minimal human intervention, aiming to double revenue in six months while publicly documenting both successes and failures.
Skyfall contends that current frontier LLMs have hit structural limits for enterprise applications. Citing their new Morpheus benchmark, they demonstrate that existing models degrade rapidly when market conditions or customer behaviors shift. Instead of prompt-driven architectures, Skyfall relies on Enterprise World Models to simulate how strategic decisions ripple across an organization.
After validating their decision-making algorithms inside the simulation game RollerCoaster Tycoon, the founders are advancing beyond constrained retail trials—such as Anthropic's Project Vend—to tackle a fully dynamic business. Ultimately, they hope to eliminate routine operational burdens (like budgeting and scheduling) so humans can focus strictly on high-level strategy, trust, and accountability.
Scientists Believed This Near-Earth Object Was an Asteroid for 28 Years. They Were Wrong:
On August 28, 2025, astronomers aimed NASA's radar system at a region of space where a near-Earth asteroid was expected to appear. Instead, the object failed to show up, leaving researchers puzzled. The unexpected no-show turned what seemed like a routine observation into a surprising case of mistaken identity.
In a study published in Nature Astronomy, a team of scientists reveals the true identity of a near-Earth object with an apparent dual personality. Scientists had been tracking the object for 28 years, assuming it might be an asteroid. Its recent deviation from its predicted path, however, suggested something unexpected is influencing the object's motion.
Although previous observations of asteroid 1998 SH2 didn't show obvious comet-like behavior, a more precise measurement of its position in the sky proved that its motion is irregular like that of a comet.
Scientists tracked the object's orbit around the Sun from 1998 to 2016, where it circled our star twice. It wasn't until 2025 that scientists attempted to carry out additional observations using NASA's Deep Space Network.
The object, provisionally known as the asteroid 1998 SH2, passed safely within 2 million miles (3 million kilometers) of our planet during its 4.5-year orbit around the Sun. Researchers calculated its position using data from previous orbits and factored in the effects the Sun's gravity, as well as the planets, would have on its path. They then pointed NASA's array of giant radio antennas toward that specific point in the sky, but asteroid 1998 SH2 didn't show up.
"After we measured the nongravitational perturbations affecting the motion of 1998 SH2 and recognized they weren't compatible with the object being an asteroid, we suspected the object could be an active comet," Davide Farnocchia, a navigation engineer with the Center for Near-Earth Object Studies at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory and lead author of the study, said in a statement .
By scouring previous observations of the near-Earth object, the researchers determined that it may be generating a small thrust by venting gas into space. That small thrust would cause it to deviate from its predicted path.
When a comet passes closely to the Sun, the heat from the star turns its ice to gas. Scientists usually identify regular comets by their trademark tail and coma, the gas and dust surrounding a comet's nucleus. In the case of 1998 SH2, the amount of outpouring gas and dust was in much smaller quantities, so its resulting tail and coma were not detectable in most observations.
The researchers behind the new study set out to get a closer look at 1998 SH2 during its August 2025 close approach. They enlisted the help of astronomers at the 3.6-meter (12-foot) Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope near the summit of Mauna Kea, Hawaii, and the 1.5-meter (5-foot) European Southern Observatory's Danish Telescope in La Silla, Chile, as well as the European Southern Observatory's 8.2-meter (27-foot) Very Large Telescope on the Chilean mountain Cerro Paranal.
"The images we collected from these observatories showed a weak but clear tail, thus confirming that 1998 SH2 is, in fact, a comet," Olivier Hainaut, an astronomer with the European Southern Observatory and coauthor of the study, said in a statement. "That's how science works — you form a hypothesis, and you set out to test it. This data is exactly what was needed to confirm our hypothesis that 1998 SH2 was a comet."
As a result, 1998 SH2 will receive an additional comet provisional designation as P/1998 SH2.
The new study also sheds light on an enigmatic class of objects known as dark comets , which tend to look like an asteroid but behave like a comet. Dark comets also exhibit trajectories that are a little unusual for asteroids, and yet they don't show the trademark tail and coma of a regular comet.
The researchers behind the study believe that some of these dark comets may just be regular comets with a faint tail and coma. Therefore, they should be observed with powerful telescopes to reveal their true identity.
"This work shows the importance of continuously tracking near-Earth objects," Farnocchia said. "Because of outgassing, the motion of comets is more significantly perturbed than that of asteroids. Detecting these perturbations can be an important diagnostic tool for planetary defense that will help understand which objects may be comets rather than asteroids, how their orbits evolve, and how that influences their Earth impact risks."
https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2026/07/i-wanted-a-clock-that-never-needed-setting-things-escalated/
I wanted a clock that, annoyingly, didn't seem to exist.
[...]
My perfect clock would be self-setting. It would offer auto-DST adjustment (or not, depending on how this bill fares!). It would manage drift and always show the exact sub-second time. It would show that time on a red seven-segment display—not blue, not green, not yellow, and absolutely not white.
[...]
Battery-backed self-setting "atomic" clocks that get their updates via the cosmic ether have been a thing for years and get me most of the way there, but damned if I could find one with a red seven-segment display that I liked (maybe someone else's search kung-fu is better than mine?).
[...]
I thought to myself, "Wait a second. I've got a 3D printer. I'm, like, smart and stuff. Why not buy a seven-segment display and make my own clock?"And so, standing on the shoulders of giants stacked up so high that I could practically touch the Moon, I did.
[...]
here's the finished repo. It contains my bill of materials with prices and purchase locations, the software, and the 3D printer files
[...]
a Pi gave me the security blanket of a Debian-based operating system, complete with Wi-Fi and NTP for the "the clock sets and updates itself" requirement, along with the usual Linux remote management routine I already know.Picking a seven-segment display was easy: Adafruit makes awesome clock-face style LED displays with 1.2-inch high numerals, and it sells a kit that bundles the display I want with a "backpack" board containing the HT16K33 controller needed to drive the LEDs. I ordered three and ended up using all of them for testing, assembly, and figuring out how to solder.
[...]
I grabbed a baby's-first-soldering-iron kit from Amazon and a roll of 60/40 solder. (I also had to buy a desktop magnifying lens, because as I found out when I got in there, these old eyes can't focus up close like they once could.)
[...]
I distilled my software requirements down to a list:
- The clock host should be LAN-only and not accessible from the Internet
- The clock host should get its updates from a LAN-only apt mirror
- The clock host should get its NTP sync from a LAN-only NTP server
- The clock service should be a systemd service running unprivileged under a dedicated service account context
- The clock service should use the system time, so the host OS handles NTP and keeps us in sync with whatever DST is or isn't doing
- The clock service should be able to turn the display on and off on a schedule so it's off for most of the day when I'm not in the bedroom
- The clock service should also be able to brighten/dim its display on a schedule
- The clock service should have some way of being controlled via the CLI for terminal connections, too
- The display should be controllable via HomeKit, because I live in iOS-land
- The clock service and its dependencies should be installable via a single script
- Once installed, everything should be deployable so I can push updates if needed rather than having to log in and reinstall
[...]
But I started to worry when I looked up examples of how to communicate with the clock display via I2C. My much-atrophied Python muscles were already straining and would absolutely not be able to meet this challenge. This was the point where the project stopped feeling fun and started feeling impossibly hard.So I shoved the coding tasks off onto an LLM.
[...]
Claude Code proved more than capable enough to tackle this project—first with Opus 4.8 and then later with the new fancy Fable model, whose world-ending powers I harnessed and used on what is probably in truth an intern-level coding project.
[...]
I know this admission may be anathema to many among the Ars commentariat, but it is what it is—without the LLM, I wouldn't have finished the project. I would have gotten annoyed, angry, or just tired of endlessly reading StackOverflow posts criticizing what I'm trying to do for being dumb and wrong.
[...]
On the physical side, I did indeed find a Creative Commons-licensed 3D-printable enclosure designed around the same Adafruit display I was using, but it wasn't quite right.Modifying the model meant doing battle with the absurdly user-hostile nightmare that is Autodesk Fusion, so I girded my loins and dove in—and hit another wall. Parametric modeling, especially when weighted down with decades of AutoCAD's stupid UI/UX choices, was even harder than programming.
[...]
Fusion now ships with an MCP server, so I could potentially let an LLM remote control the application and make the modifications for me.
[...]
I first tried my modifications with a quantized version of Qwen 3.6-35B (this one, specifically)
[...]
was almost up to the task, making one of my changes but flubbing the other; I fell back on Claude Code and Fable to handle most of the model adjustments.
[...]
Emboldened by not screwing up the soldering too badly and now having a live display to mess with, I pressed on. The next thing to deal with was that while the Adafruit display is dimmable, even at minimum dimness, it still proved too bright for a dark bedroom.
[...]
I ended up pairing the NDF with some smoked acrylic
[...]
The next issue was iterating through all the model changes necessary to incorporate the acrylic and NDF into the clock case. I ended up (via LLM MCP magic) splitting the existing design into a few more separate pieces and cutting out a pocket for the acrylic face; I also had the LLM add guide pins and holes for each piece.
[...]
The end result exactly matched my expectations—the best criterion for success that I can think of. With an LLM providing the heavy code lifting and the CAD work, I think I spent more time waiting on supplies to arrive than on anything else—something attributable to my lack of planning and the ease of next-day delivery.
[...]
this was a great hobby project. I got to solder stuff, which was both harder and easier than I expected. I used miles of filament while printing and re-printing different iterations of the case. And I learned a ton.I spent... well, a lot more money than I intended to, between a couple of false starts, the soldering iron and kit, and extra supplies for redundancy and do-overs. And I could have compromised and gotten a regular clock that does most of what I want. But the experience was fun, and the joy of having exactly what I want is priceless.
It Started With a Football Agent Registration.
So FIFA has this thing called the FIFA Agent Platform . It's a public portal where you can register to become a licensed football agent. You submit your ID, verify your email, and you're in. Simple enough.
What I didn't expect was what happened next.
When you register on agents.fifa.org, FIFA adds your account to their Microsoft Entra tenant (formerly Azure AD). That's the same tenant that powers all of FIFA's internal platforms. And I mean all of them.
My first two attempts actually failed because the lighting on my ID photos wasn't good enough:
"Registration failed during the last step of checking your identification." - apparently FIFA has higher standards for my selfie than my actual security
But the third attempt went through. And I received this beautiful email:
Subject line: "FIFA - FAP - CONFIRMATION". Yes, FIFA's Agent Platform is officially called FAP. I cannot make this up. FAP CONFIRMATION. Moving on.
After registration, I tried navigating to fdp.fifa.org - FIFA's Football Data Platform. The app authenticated me through the shared Entra tenant, checked my roles, found I had none, and showed me:
"Sorry, you do not have any FIFA Football Data Platform role assigned to your account."
Looks like it works, right? Access denied. Go away. Nothing to see here.
Except this was all client-side . The Angular app checked the JWT for a NO_ROLES marker and rendered the access-denied page. The backend APIs? They didn't check anything. They just served whatever you asked for.
After bypassing the client-side guards, I landed on the Streaming Management panel. And my jaw hit the floor.
Every single FIFA World Cup 2026 match. With streaming controls.
This wasn't some dev environment. This wasn't test data. This was the live production Streaming Management panel for the FIFA World Cup 2026. Every match. Every camera angle. Every RTMP ingest URL. Every stream key.
[...] It wasn't just read access. The Streaming Management panel had full controls. Start, stop, schedule. For every match. Every camera angle.
One click. That's all it would take to kill a live World Cup camera feed.
I did not touch any of these controls. But they were there. Functional. Waiting for anyone with a NO_ROLES account to press them.
[...] The Streaming Management panel wasn't the only thing exposed. My NO_ROLES account had access to the entire platform.
Competitions, Matches, Teams, Tools, Exchange Platform, Analysis Dashboard, Commentator Information System, FIFA AI Pro, Admin. All accessible.
[...] Here's where it gets worse. The Management tab on fdp.fifa.org has write operations. And the backend accepts them from a NO_ROLES account.
"Update Live Stats" with a rich text editor, match time, match score fields, and an "Edit and Publish" button
Attendance, Possession, Post Match Statistics, Team Registration Statistics, Analysis Finished, Score and Statistics, Adjust Kick-off Moment, Performance Data, Send Tactical Lineup, Event Ingress Details
An attacker could:
- Modify editorial commentary notes and publish them to broadcast systems
- Adjust the official kick-off moment
- Send tactical lineup data
- Change scores and match statistics
This data feeds into the Commentator Information System and gets displayed on live television.
[...] The whole thing boils down to one architectural mistake: client-side authorization with no server-side enforcement .
FIFA's internal applications use Microsoft Entra for authentication and role-based access control. The Angular/React/Vue frontends check the JWT token for role claims and render access-denied pages accordingly. But the backend APIs trust any authenticated tenant member and serve data regardless of roles.
The attack chain:
- Register on agents.fifa.org (public)
- Get added to FIFA's Entra tenant
- Authenticate against any FIFA internal app
- Client says "access denied"
- Server says "here's everything"
[...] To FIFA:
You fixed it fast. Credit where it's due. But:
- Get a security.txt file. Seriously. It's 2026.
- Publish a VDP (Vulnerability Disclosure Policy). You're running the biggest sporting event on earth.
- Client-side authorization is not authorization. Every intern learns this.
- When a researcher has to call CISA and the FBI to reach you, something is wrong.
- Start a bug bounty program. Researchers shouldn't have to call the FBI to do you a favor.
So long and thanks for all the Fish :3
Still think about those RTMP stream keys sometimes. Somewhere in a parallel universe, billions of people are watching Subway Surfers gameplay during the World Cup final. All it took was an ID.
;
If you're in the market for a frontier-class open weights model, your options are few and far between outside of the Chinese model houses.
With the Wednesday release of a new model codenamed "Inkling," an outfit called Thinking Machines Lab aims to change that.
Founded in early 2025 by former OpenAI CTO Mira Murati, Thinking Machines' first model is a big one. Weighing in at 975 billion parameters, the model requires more than two terabytes of GPU memory — a quantity present in around eight of Nvidia's B300 accelerators, or sixteen H200s — to run at its native 16-bit precision. If that's asking too much of your hardware, Thinking Machines has also released a NVFP4 quantized version of the model capable of running on half the GPUs.
This makes it the largest American open weights model to date, and comparable to Chinese models like DeepSeek V4, GLM 5.2, and Kimi K2.6 in terms of size and capabilities. Take these claims with a grain of salt — gaming AI benchmarks isn't exactly difficult — but Thinking Machines says Inkling is competitive with these models in a variety of workloads, although its benchmark charts also show it trailing proprietary models like Anthropic's Claude and OpenAI's GPT.
Thinking Machines describes the model as being highly adaptable, intended for use by developers building AI apps, but suitable for general purpose applications like chat bots. And because it's being released under a highly permissive Apache 2.0 license, end users are free to fine tune it for their specific use case. The company's Tinker platform offers tools to do just that.
In fact, Thinking Machines boasts that the model is capable of writing its own fine tuning scripts to refine its behavior, teach itself new skills, and evaluate its abilities.
[...] Like most LLMs today, Inkling is a "reasoning model" which is to say it's been trained using reinforcement learning (RL) to use chain of thought to "think" through requests before responding.
[...] If you prefer to evaluate the model on your own hardware, it's available for download on popular model repos like Hugging Face. At launch, the model claims support for a broad range of inference engines including vLLM, SGLang, Miles, TokenSpeed, and Llama.cpp.
Blue Origin and SpaceX get their turn to prove they can dock, loiter, and not blow up the launch pad:
NASA has given an update on the Artemis III mission and, while sticking with an optimistic 2028 landing target for Artemis IV, offered a glimpse into just how much development work remains to be done at Blue Origin and SpaceX.
Artemis III has been compared to Apollo 9, which tested the Apollo Lunar Module in Earth orbit, yet neither SpaceX nor Blue Origin is flying anything as close to the lunar landers.
Blue Origin's test lander will be based on the company's current Mark 2 crew lander architecture, incorporating the major avionics, flight software, life support, and crew cabin. Orion, launched atop NASA's SLS, will dock to the side of the Blue Origin spacecraft for crew transfer; two crew members in orange Orion survival suits can baord the test lander, with Orion's software controlling the stack.
An instrumented lunar surface spacesuit mass simulator, similar to the "Moonikin" manikin that flew aboard Orion for Artemis I, will also ride along on the Blue Origin lander.
SpaceX's test is considerably simpler - just a docking system mounted on the nose of a Starship. That requires Starship testing to have reached the orbital stage first, which is why NASA will be closely watching the upcoming Flight Test 13. Starship V3 is still flying suborbital until SpaceX proves it can reliably relight an engine for controlled re-entry.
Under the current plan, Blue Origin launches its lander into orbit first, where it can loiter for up to 30 days. Once it's checked out, a crew launches aboard Orion to rendezvous and dock with it. After that's complete, SpaceX launches its Starship test article to rendezvous and dock Orion in turn, though the crew won't board Starship, just verify communications and interoperability. SpaceX's vehicle will control that docked stack.
Notably, SpaceX's docking capability was qualified in 2023, while Blue Origin only tested its pressurized docking system earlier this year.
Jeremy Parsons, Artemis program manager, stated, "Artemis III will be a highly choreographed dance with a demanding launch sequence across multiple launch pads and equally demanding mission operations for our ground and flight crews, making it one of the most complex and ambitious missions NASA has ever undertaken."
He is not exaggerating. Apollo 9 needed a single Saturn V launch; Artemis III needs three – an SLS, whatever Blue Origin ultimately uses to launch its lander (the company is still rebuilding its launch pad after May's explosion), and a Starship. The SLS has flown twice, including one lunar flyby. Starship has yet to reach orbit despite Elon Musk once claiming that uncrewed versions would be landing on Mars around now.
It'll be an impressive feat if NASA can pull it off, even if SpaceX's piece of the puzzle looks a lot simpler than Blue Origin's.